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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Petition for modification of decree of divorce and counter-
petition for modification of decree of divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted defendant's request for modification 
of decree of divorce requiring plaintiff to pay one-half (h) of the 
travel expenses incident to transporting the four (4) minor 
children of the parties to Salt Lake City and back to California 
where they now reside with their mother; and denied plaintiff's 
petition for modification of decree of divorce for increased child 
support for the four (4) minor children where defendant's income 
had increased from $45,000.00 in 1973 to $70,000.00 in 1975, and 
the expenses and costs to support the minor children had increased 
substantially. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the Lower Court's order and judgment modifying 
the decree of divorce, requiring plaintiff to pay one-half (h) 
of the travel expenses incident to transporting the four (4) minor 
children to Salt Lake City from California and return for two (2) 
visitation periods per year; and reversal of the Lower Court's order 
and judgment denying plaintiff's petition for increased support 
with instructions to award plaintiff increased support. In the 
alternative, to reverse in total the order and judgment modifying 
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(2) 
the decree of divorce and grant to plaintiff-appellant a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff-appellant was granted a decree of divorce from 
the defendant-respondent on the 17th day of July, 1973, which 
decree became final three (3) months after entry. Plaintiff-
appellant was awarded custody of the then five (5) minor children 
and defendant was ordered to pay support of $150.00 per month per 
child pursuant to a property settlement agreement. (R. 61-82). 
Plaintiff-appellant was awarded alimony, which was in effect a 
property settlement in that it was to continue in the event of 
her remarriagef by agreement, at the rate of $1,000.00 per month 
until 1984 or her death; and was based upon defendant-respondent's 
estimated income for the year 1973 of $45,000.00. (R. 63-65; 71-
73; 78-80). Both parties have remarried. Plaintiff-appellant's 
present husband, Mr. Hunsaker, found employment in Utah to be 
unsatisfactory. He determined opportunity for employment to be 
better in California, thus, requiring moving to California. (T. 24) 
Plaintiff-appellant sold the home occupied by her and the children, 
which home was awarded to her by stipulated agreement in the 
decree of divorce, and moved to California with the four (4) re-
maining minor children in November of 1975. On or about November 
13, 1975, defendant-respondent filed a petition for order to show 
cause asking that the decree of divorce be modified with regard to 
visitation rights and that plaintiff-appellant be required to pay 
one-half of the air travel expenses incident to visitation of the 
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(3) 
minor children, and he be allowed to deduct such expenses from 
the alimony payments he is obligated to pay to his former wife. 
(R. 144-148). Plaintiff-appellant filed a reply to defendant-
respondent's petition and a counter-petition for modification of 
decree of divorce setting forth visitation rights she was agree-
able to; contesting that she be required to pay one-half of the 
expenses of travel for visitation; and requesting that the support 
for the four (4) remaining minor children be increased from 
$150.00 per month per child to $200.00 per month per child based 
upon substantial increased costs to support the children and a 
corresponding substantial increase in defendant's income. (R. 154-
160). After hearing held on April 16, 1976, the Lower Court, 
Judge Bryant H. Croft, denied plaintiff-appellant's petition to 
increase child support; and granted defendant-respondent's petition 
to charge one-half of the travel expenses for visitation with the 
four (4) minor children against plaintiff for two (2) visitation 
periods per year—one at Christmas time and one in the summer and 
at such other time as the parties may agree. (R. 171). Mr. Gustin, 
attorney for defendant-respondent, prepared findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and judgment modifying decree of divorce as required 
by the minute entry of Judge Croft (R. 171; 172-179), which findings, 
conclusions and judgment contained matters concerning visitation 
rights not ordered by the Court. Plaintiff-appellant then filed 
a motion for relief from the judgment (R. 189) concerning the 
error in the visitation rights, which the Lower Court declined to 
hear in that this appeal was then pending. From the order and judg-
ment of the Lower Court denying plaintiff-appellant's petition for 
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(4) 
increased support based upon material change of circumstances, 
and granting defendant-respondent's petition modifying the decree 
of divorce requiring plaintiff to pay one-half the travel ex-
penses incident to transporting the four (4) remaining minor 
children from California to Salt Lake City and back for visitation 
twice a year without any showing of financial hardship on defend-
ant-respondent, plaintiff-appellant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION OF PLAINTIFF 
FOR INCREASED SUPPORT WHERE THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Courts, in exercise of continuing jurisdiction over 
divorce cases, are given considerable discretion and latitude as 
to "subsequent changes or new orders" with respect to support and 
maintenance of children, which discretion is bounded by what, in 
the opinion of the Court, is "reasonable and necessary" and in 
the "best interests and welfare of the children". (30-3-5 Utah 
Code Annotated as amended 19 53). To secure a modification of a 
support award in a divorce decree, the moving party must allege and 
prove changed conditions arising since the entry of the decree, 
requiring under rules of equity and justice a change in the 
decree. Ring v. Ring, 29 U.2d 436, 511 P.2d 155; Felt v. Felt, 
27 U.2d 103, 493 P.2d 620; Gardner v. Gardner, 111 Utah 286, 177 
P.2d 743; Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P.2d 222. Thus, the 
burden of showing change of circumstances to warrant increasing 
support for the four (4) minor children of the parties was plaintif 
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(5) 
Allen v, Allen, 25 U.2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
20 U.2d 360, 438 P.2d 180. The criterion being the needs of the 
person supported and defendant's ability to pay. Anderson v. 
Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132. Plaintiff, in the evidence 
presented, met this burden by an overwhelming preponderance of 
the evidence in that she established: That (1) defendant's income 
had increased in two years from $45,000.00 in 1973 to $70,000.00 
in 1975, an increase of $25,000.00 per year (T. 48, 56); That (2) 
defendant's take home pay had increased to $54,000.00 in 1975 
from $32,000.00 in 1973 (T. 59, 70); That (3) the expenses of 
supporting the children had increased substantially due to the 
rise in cost of living for food, utilities, etc. since the entry 
of the decree (T. 20-25, 31-33); That (4) she was to incur dental 
expenses on behalf of one of the children (T. 35); That (5) Debbie 
needed glasses (T. 35); That (6) it was costing an average of 
$354.40 per month to support each child with defendant only con-
tributing $150.00 per month toward these expenses (T. 21); That 
(7) she had not worked for 25 years and was not qualified for 
employment (T. 19); That (8) defendant had access to an additional 
$12,000.00 annual income from JAMCO, his solely owned company, 
having a net worth of $80,000.00 (T. 50-52, 58-59); That (9) as 
the controlling stockholder of Utility Trailer Sales, defendant's 
employer, defendant determined his own salary and bonus (T. 49, 55-
56) with his income being tied to the tax structure rather than 
his needs (T. 55) and additional profits allowed to accumulate; 
That (10) defendant had a profit sharing plan valued in excess of 
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(6) 
$65,000.00 in addition to the accumulation of earnings of JAMCO 
as a retirement (T. 64, 68). 
In the case of Harrison v. Harrison, 22 U.2d 180, 450 P.2d 
4 56, this Court held that there was a sufficient showing of change 
of circumstances to support modification of decree where the 
defendant's income was greater than at the time of the decree. 
In this case, defendant's (Mr. Fake) income increased more than 
55 percent in two years from the time of the decree of divorce. 
Increased living expenses in supporting minor children has 
been considered and recognized as sufficient change of circumstance 
to increase support payments, especially in light of the fact that 
the cost of living has increased substantially in the past two 
years. See Ericksen v. Ericksen, 8 U.2d 381, 355 P.2d 618; Carlton 
v. Carlton, 4 U.2d 332, 294 P.2d 316; Craven v. Craven, 119 Utah 
476, 229 P.2d 301; Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986. 
The defendant testified that his expenses of supporting his 
present family were rather substantial. However, our Courts have 
consistently recognized that defendant's first family has priority 
in these matters. The minor children of defendant are the first 
and foremost obligation of defendant, and they are entitled to 
be provided with the standard of living which the defendant should 
furnish them. See King v. King, 25 U.2d 163, 478 P.2d 492; Germer 
v. Germer, 17 U.2d 393, 412 P.2d 923; Ericksen v. Ericksen (supra); 
Sorensen v. Sorensen (supra). The fact that defendant had re-
married and had purchased and furnished a new home with partially 
borrowed funds (T. 53-54); was contributing $2,600.00 a year to 
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(7) 
support a child of his present wife in college (T. 60); that he 
anticipated expenses in supporting his daughter Susan in college 
in the approximate sum of $2,000.00 per year, which expense was 
clearly in the consideration of the parties at the time of the 
decree of divorce (T. 61) do not constitute grounds for denying 
plaintiff's petition for increased support where there has been a 
clear showing of changed circumstances. King v. King (supra); 
King v. King, 27 U.2d 303, 495 P.2d 823; Sorensen v. Sorensen 
(supra). 
In the instant case, the Trial Court erred in denying plain-
tiff's petition for increased child support where the evidence 
presented so overwhelmingly established a material change of 
circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce that 
required, under the rules of equity and justice within the guide-
lines of "reasonable and necessary" and "the best interests and 
welfare of the children", that the child support be increased to 
at least $200.00 per month per child under the present state of 
circumstances. 
The prerogatives and broad discretion accorded the Trial 
Court in matters of divorce does not extend to arbitrary and un-
reasoning power to disregard credible and uncontradicted evidence. 
It was a clear abuse of the Trial Court's discretion in denying 
plaintiff's petition for increased support in light of the evidence 
presented and at the same time adding materially to plaintiff's 
expenses by requiring her to pay one-half (h) of the travel ex-
penses of the children for visitation. The order denying plaintiff's 
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(8) 
petition for increased support should be reversed with instructions 
to the Lower Court to award plaintiff increased support in accord-
ance with said petition, 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 
PAY ONE-HALF {h) THE TRAVEL EXPENSES OF THE FOUR (4) 
MINOR CHILDREN FOR VISITATION WAS ERROR WHERE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO PROVE CHANGED CONDITIONS REQUIRING UNDER 
RULES OF EQUITY AND JUSTICE A CHANGE IN THE DECREE. 
It is the contention of plaintiff that in order for the 
Lower Court to grant the petition of defendant to modify the 
decree of divorce requiring the plaintiff to pay one-half (h) 
of the travel expenses of the four (4) minor children for visi-
tation purposes that defendant must allege and prove changed con-
ditions arising since the entry of the decree, requiring under 
rules of equity and justice a change in the decree, (See cases 
cited in Point I). The net effect of the Court's order in requirin 
plaintiff to pay one-half (h) of the travel expenses of the four 
(4) minor children for visitation purposes is to decrease the 
support monies already ordered to be paid by defendant to plaintiff 
for the support and maintenance of the minor children. This is 
clearly contrary to the rules of equity and justice under the 
circumstances and the evidence presented at the time of hearing. 
The mere fact that plaintiff changed her residency with the minor 
children from the State of Utah to the State of California is not 
sufficient change of circumstances which would warrant in effect a 
decrease of the support payments ordered to be paid by defendant to 
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(9) 
plaintiff for the minor children. 
In the case of Earl v. Earl, 17 U.2d 156, 406 P.2d 302, this 
Court stated: 
"***The right of child to support is a paramount 
right which it possesses quite apart from any 
consideration relating to the conduct of its 
divorced parents. The mere removing of the child 
from the jurisdiction is not sufficient in the 
absence of further evidence as to the reasons for 
such removal to sustain an order changing the 
right to support payments.***" 
The Lower Court, prior to hearing any of the evidence, was 
disposed to order plaintiff to pay some of the costs of returning 
the children to the State for visitation. Thus, the Lower Court 
was somewhat prejudiced against plaintiff in favor of defendant. 
(T. 3-4, 15). Defendant presented no evidence which would indicate 
that he was financially unable to afford the costs of the travel 
expenses of bringing the children from. California to Utah for the 
purpose of visitation. In fact, the evidence presented was to 
the contrary in that defendant had paid entirely the costs of all 
of the children visiting during Christmas of 1975. (T. 4). Further, 
the evidence presented as set out in Point I of this brief clearly 
shows that defendant's income had substantially increased since 
the entry of the decree of divorce, that he had access to addi-
tional income in excess of $12,000.00 through his solely owned 
company of JAMCO, and that he had additional income by reason of 
the fact that the salary and bonuses he received from Utility 
Trailer Sales, of which he was the controlling stockholder, was 
tied to tax structure and not to his actual needs. That the company 
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(10) 
had accumulated additional profits and retained earnings over the 
years in excess of $22,000.00, after the. payment of salaries and 
taxes and other expenses. (T. 49, 56, 57, 59). Thus, defendant 
failed to show any change of conditions whioh would justify the 
order of the Lower Court requiring plaintiff to pay one-half {%) 
of the travel expenses of visitation of the minor children. Scott 
v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.'2d 198; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 
261, 225 Pac. 76. Defendant clearly failed to meet the burden 
required for a change of circumstances as set down by the cases 
cited in Point I of this brief, and in applying the criterion as 
set down in the case of Anderson v. Anderson (supra). The costs 
to support the minor children had increased and exceeded the amount 
of support contributed by defendant by $200.00 per month for each 
child. The defendant unquestionably had a much greater ability to 
pay travel expenses of the children for visitation where he had 
experienced a substantial increase in income and plaintiff's income 
had not. 
The evidence presented by defendant in support of his petitio: 
to have plaintiff pay a portion of the travel expenses of visita-
tion with the minor children was mainly expenses he was incurring 
in supporting his second family. In the case of Sorensen v. Soren-
sen (supra), this Court rejected such expenses as grounds for a 
change of circumstances on the basis that they are voluntary. This 
Court has also recognized that the taking on of a new family obli-
gation is subordinate to defendant's prior obligation to his first 
family. See King v. King (supra). 
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(11) 
The defendant failed to make out a proper case for change 
of circumstances which would warrant a modification of the decree 
of divorce under the rules of equity and justice so as to place 
upon plaintiff the burden of paying one-half (h) of the travel 
expenses of the minor children for visitation. The order of the 
Lower Court requiring plaintiff to pay one-half (h) of the travel 
expenses of the minor children should be reversed in that the 
evidence does not support or sustain such order. 
•--
;:
 CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff clearly met her burden of proving a material 
and substantial change of circumstances since the entry of decree 
of divorce which would support a modification of the decree of 
divorce increasing support payments ordered to be paid by defendant 
to plaintiff from $150.00 per month to $200.00 per month where the 
costs of supporting the children have risen substantially and 
defendant had experienced a corresponding increase in income in 
excess of 55 percent in the two years since the entry of decree of 
divorce. The Lower Court erred in denying plaintiff's petition for 
increased support payments and the order denying plaintiff's 
petition for increased support should be reversed with instructions 
to the Lower Court to enter an order modifying the decree of 
divorce and increasing the support for the minor children from 
$150.00 per month per child to $.200.00 per month per child under 
the evidence presented. 
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(12) 
The facts and circumstances of this case and the evidence 
presented require reversal of the order of the Court modifying 
the decree of divorce requiring plaintiff to pay one-half (h) of 
the travel expenses of the four (4) minor children for visitation 
purposes where defendant clearly failed to meet the required burden 
of proof of showing a change of circumstances which would warrant 
such order under the rules of equity and justice. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
^ 
^ 
, jmmrat 
E. V. FAN&HAUSER of 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER 
& BEASLEY 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Served two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief Of Appellant 
on Respondent by delivering 
the same to Frank J. Gustin 
at 1610 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on this 
*2& day of September, 1976. 
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